CFFP's perspective on the AHC8
Thanks to the kind support of the Alliance of NGOs for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) could take part in the last reconvened session of negotiations on a UN Cybercrime Convention, too. CFFP is an independent intersectional feminist human rights think tank, advocacy and consulting organisation dedicated to advocating for Feminist Foreign Policy. It was co-founded in 2018 by Kristina Lunz and Nina Bernarding in Berlin and challenges the conventional norms of international politics, particularly its emphasis on militarised state security, and instead promotes policies that prioritise human rights and the security of individuals and communities across all areas of foreign policy. Based in Berlin, CFFP operates at the German national level as well as at the European and international levels: We cooperate with a global mulit-stakeholder network to promote intersectional feminist concepts in foreign and security policy, inter alia by centring women's, LGBTQIA+ individuals' and other vulnerable groups' voices and the lived experiences of those most marginalised.
Throughout the negotiations, feminist perspectives and demands were largely ignored; despite the fact that women, LGBTQIA+ communities (e.g., activists and journalists) and other marginalised groups are disproportionately affected by cybercrime: Online harrassment and gender-based violence, unauthorised sharing of intimate or artifically altered content as well as gendered disinformation target women and LGBTQIA+ individuals specifically and increasingly. At the same time, existing national cybercrime legislation seldomly protects women and other marginalised groups from such threats – on the contrary, not only has it proven to be ineffective, but it has also put them at risk. Especially in countries experiencing autocratization or democratic backsliding, where cultural and / or legal sanctions against certain gender identities are in place, cybercrime laws have been used to criminalise, prosecute, surveil and/or silence women and LGBTQIA+ people as well as critical voices. As Derechos Digitales and Association for Progressive Communications (APC) rightly highlight in their exploratory report suitably titled „When Protection Becomes an Excuse for Criminalisation“: Both online spaces and criminal systems operate within societies that are already marked by (structural) inequalities - depending on how cybercrime regulation is designed, it thus has the potential to strenghten digital human rights, but also to deepen inequalities based on gender and other identity markers, inter alia through the criminalisation of legitimate online expression which can cause a chilling effect regarding human rights advocacy, political protest and critical journalistic reporting. As APC's and Derechos Digitales’ exploratory research maps at the example of 11 cases across the world, existing local cybercrime laws are often characterised by broad and vague definitions, create legal uncertainty and allow for arbitrary application, ignoring or even undermining general principles of international (human rights) law. These cases should be taken as a warning sign and serve as a cautionary example when it comes to advancing international norms and cooperation on the fight against cybercrime. From an intersectional feminist perspective, it is particularly important to make sure that cybercrime legislation does not illegitimately limit the freedom of expression and gender equality online, given the fact that digital technologies have played a pivotal role in combating the historical exclusion of marginalised communities from public discourse and offline civic spaces. If the voices of these groups are silenced on the Internet, it is possible that they will not be heard at all.
Against this background, it was particularly alarming to see that – just like civil society has pointed out in previous joint statements on other sessions of negotiations - also this last session was marked by permanent attempts by some states to further water down references to human rights and gender. There even were proposals to totally exclude references to gender (that had by then already siginficantly been reduced) from the treaty text. Moreover, although gender mainstreaming was finally included in the preamble, this reference is not sufficient to prevent the Convention from being used to undermine people's human rights on the basis of gender. Effective gender-mainstreaming, advocated for by civil society since day one, would have meant to include gender considerations throughout the whole Convention (i.e., in every article) and to pursue gender equality as a specific goal (i.e., through an individual article) at the same time. In its final form, the Draft Convention only contains two additional mentions of gender beyond the preamble: one concerning the consideration of gender in the article on assistance and protection of victims (Art. 34) and the second one addresses gender-based violence in the context of preventive measures (Art. 53). This highlights the little importance states have given to gender equality and women's equal right to freedom of opinion and expression, despite empirical evidence underlining that „women journalists, politicians, human rights defenders and feminist activists [are] particularly targeted with vicious, coordinated online attacks in order to intimidate, silence and drive them off social media platforms and out of public life, undermining human rights, media diversity and inclusive democracy” (UN OHCHR, 2021). It seemed like „gender“ has served amongst the bargaining chips that are dropped first, also by democratic states, when negotiations become more difficult. Further essential points of criticism when taking a feminist and human security-based approach include the Draft Convention's overly braod scope (extending beyond cyber-dependent crimes) that could lead to its application in order to, inter alia, criminalise sexual and reproductive health and rights (such as abortion) or LGBTQIA+ identities as a whole. The possibility provided by the Draft Convention to adopt a supplementary protocol (Art. 57) poses an additional threat: if negotiated in the future, it might further broaden the scope and thus increase the existing risk of criminalising legitimate online expression. In addition, the Draft Convention still lacks sufficient human rights safeguards and data protection principles, especially when considering the strong surveillance powers accorded to states in Chapters IV and V and the weak judicial oversight, transparency, and accountability mechanisms of such surveillance measures that affect the right to privacy.
In order to discuss possible ways forward in favour of digital human rights, feminist demands and an open, safe, free and more equal digital world for all, given the adoption of the Draft Convention by the Ad Hoc Committee, CFFP is currently organising a closed-door roundtable on the topic together with Heinrich Böll Foundation Vienna, the Alliance, and other civil society partners (tbc). Stay tuned!
CFFP would like to thank Derechos Digitales and Association for Progressive Communications for their notable work and very valuable discussions and co-thinking on many of the points mentioned. Also, we would like to thank the Alliance for their guidance and support in CFFP's participation on site.
31 Aug, 2024